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This article compares and contrasts the experience of two working women as their lives 
were affected by Taiwan's economic restructuring in the late 1990s. Both women were in 
their thirties and unmarried. However, one woman's decision to remain single and return to 
school caused a major disagreement in her family, while the other's decision was respected by 
her family. Two factors are particularly instructive in explaining these differences. The first is 
the pattern of their labor market participation, which reflected the way in which each of their 
families was incorporated into Taiwan's economy and thus the structural constraints each 
family faced under the recent economic restructuring. This was further augmented by the 
issue of marriage. As marriage is viewed as part of a Taiwanese woman's destiny, these 
women had to find a culturally acceptable alternative in order for their decisions to be 




Probably due to the short history of industrialization in many parts of the developing 
world, much of the gender and global industrialization literature (e.g., Chow, 2003; Nash & 
Fernandez-Kelly, 1983; Rothstein & Blim, 1992; Ward, 1990) emphasizes the opening stage 
of transformation when women in a society, single or married, were first recruited into 
factory work. This emphasis tends to be concerned with the global and local interaction at the 
juncture when social relations in a newly industrializing economy are initially reconfigured, 
with culture as a significant interlocutor. However, over time, whether a particular practice 
based on gender ideologies adopted for the benefit of either capital or labor can be 
continuously effective depends on its articulation with the ever-changing global and local 
economic conditions. Furthermore, granted a different context, the same cultural ideology 
employed to legitimize the subordination of women in any given society could also be drawn 
upon by the women themselves as a strategy to subvert their subordination. Therefore, the 
study of gender and global industrialization should focus not only on cultural distinctions 
based on locale, or the interaction of gender and other stratifying factors within a 
socio-cultural system, but also on how gender can produce different effects and meanings 
over time under different historical-economic circumstances. This is especially evident in 
Taiwan where the economy transformed within a few decades from one based on agriculture 
to one centering on manufacturing, and currently moving towards service industries. The 
pattern of labor deployment, as well as the labor available for deployment, differs at each of 
these stages. Given the short span of time involved, I argue that the impact of these 





To illustrate these points, this article compares and contrasts the experiences of two 
working women as their lives were affected by Taiwan's recent economic restructuring since 
the late 1980s (namely, capital outflow and deindustrialization): Wang Mei-ling, who came 
from an industrial– entrepreneurial family that owned a small textile factory, and Yang 
Ch'un-mei, who grew up in a family that had a little plot of land but not enough to feed the 
entire household. Family background aside, these two women shared much in common. 
When I first met them in the mid-1990s, they were both in their early thirties and unmarried. 
They both started laboring for their family at an early age, one at her father's factory and the 
other working for other factory owners, to help improve the economic conditions of their 
families; as a result, they missed the opportunity to continue their education as far as they 
would have hoped. To build a life and career different from the ones they had had in their 
youth, they both insisted on going back to school for more education while remaining single 
at a relatively old age. Despite these early similarities, their later experiences differed 
considerably. While one woman's decision to remain single and return to school caused a 
major uproar in her family, the other's determination won acceptance from her 
widowed mother and siblings. 
 
This article brings together two literatures that are usually discussed separately: labor and 
gender under global industrialization, and gender and family (epitomized by marriage) in the 
Chinese cultural context. In doing so, it argues that two factors are particularly useful in 
explaining these two women's varied experiences, notwithstanding the specific family 
dynamics and individual personalities involved. The first is the pattern of their labor market 
participation. The fact that one of the women labored for her family while the other worked 
for others as a hired hand does not simply signal a difference in personal choice or family 
wealth but, rather, reflects the way in which each of their families was incorporated into 
Taiwan's economy and thus the structural constraints each family faced under the recent 
economic restructuring. Specifically, while Taiwanese industrial producers continued to see 
labor as a key to their competitiveness in the global economy during the 1990s, it was 
increasingly difficult for them to find cheap labor given Taiwan's expanding labor market and 
rising number of service sector jobs, on the one hand, and young Taiwanese women's 
preference for newly created service jobs over traditional manufacturing employment, on the 
other. This particularly affected Taiwanese industrial–entrepreneurial families who, in turn, 
were ever more dependent on their children's labor to overcome this labor problem. Mei-ling 
was thus under great pressure to work for her family at a time when the job market was 
changing and increasingly diversified. In contrast, ironically, Ch'un-mei, Mei-ling's 
counterpart from a less privileged background, had no family factory to labor for but was 
highly sought after by other industrial employers. This allowed her relatively more freedom 
to pursue her personal goals. Together, their stories challenge the view implied in most of the 
demography literature that a better-off economic background and more access to education 
would give a woman more options for resisting marriage. These two cases show that the 
effects of family-level socioeconomic indicators on the outcome of marriage resistance were 
mitigated by families as economic actors. 
 
The contrast between the two women was further augmented by the fact that Ch'un-mei 
was able to find a culturally acceptable alternative to marriage. She joined the residence of a 
group of middle-aged single women who were devout followers of I-Kuan Tao [Yiguan Dao] 
(the Unity Way) and who had decided to remain single in order to perfect their religious quest. 
She convinced her mother that, even without a husband, her life would be taken care of by 
these women. In comparison, Mei-ling was not able to find an alternative social space to 
sway her parents to accept that she made a right decision. As a result, her spinster status 
caused her parents much worry about her future welfare. It was also a topic of neighborhood 
gossip and increasingly an embarrassment to the family, which, ultimately, became the root of 




The life stories of Wang Mei-ling and Yang Ch'un-mei that inform the analysis of this 
article are part of my research that investigates the impact of Taiwan's recent economic 
restructuring on the local economy and society of Homei, a small town of approximately 
90,000 residents in central Taiwan well known for its history in weaving production, with a 
chief focus on the experience of female textile workers, since the mid-1990s. The 
development of Homei's textile industry after World War II closely reflects the path of 
Taiwan's economic development in the postwar era which, in a short span of four decades, 
experienced import-substitution industrialization (1950s–early 1960s), export-oriented 
industrialization (late 1960s–1970s), the status of one of the world's manufacturing 
powerhouses (1980s), and economic restructuring (starting from the late 1980s) (Lee, 2004). 
 
At the initial stage of the research, I lived in Homei for nearly two and half years 
(September 1993–December 1995), first staying with the Wang family where I came to know 
Meiling well and later moving to the dormitory of Treasure Island, a local textile company, 
where Ch'un-mei was employed as a loom tender and one of my roommates in the dormitory. 
After my departure at the end of this period, I made regular return trips to Homei to follow up 
on its economic changes over time. My knowledge of the women textile workers is derived 
primarily from ethnographic fieldwork, namely participant observation and the everyday 
chats and conversations I had with them. Additional insight was gained from talking to other 
Homei residents, either through formal interviews or informal discussions. I also visited other 
textile factories in Homei and elsewhere in Taiwan, to obtain an understanding of the larger 
economic context within which Homei's textile industry is embedded. 
 
There is always a certain arbitrariness in how the researcher in an ethnographic study 
comes to associate him/herself closely with particular individuals, households, and/or social 
groups or organizations, which often became the primary source of their information. 
However, the life stories of Mei-ling and Ch'un-mei were not chosen simply because they 
happened to be a member of the family – or an employee of the textile company – that 
housed me during my research. They were chosen because their workplaces – the Wang 
family factory and Treasure Island presented two different kinds of production organizations 
that were representative not only of Homei's textile industry but, to large extent, also of 
Taiwan's manufacturing sector (Chen, 2001; Hsu, 2005; SMEA, 2008b). The Wang family 
factory was typical in Taiwan's highly decentralized industrial system (Hsiung, 1996; Hu, 
1984; Ka, 1993). Its production size was small, and the nature of their business was 
subcontracting. Family members constituted the core of its workforce, although from time to 
time additional workers were hired from outside the family. The Wang family, like their 
counterparts countrywide, depended primarily on the collaboration and cooperation of family 
members to overcome economic ups-and-downs. On the other hand, with more than one 
hundred production worker on its payroll, Treasure Island was considered a big company not 
only locally but also by Taiwan's industrial standards, although it was still tiny by the world's 
standards (SMEA, 2008a). It was not a family business but had multiple investors, all of 
whom had a voice in major company decisions. The relatively large size of Treasure Island 
also made it necessary to develop a more complex and hierarchical organizational structure 
with several layers of management, which in turn required shop floor managers to utilize 
formal management policies and labor recruitment strategies other than relying on personal 
relations and/or social obligations as the head of a family firm (usually the eldest male [or son] 
in the family) would mostly do. Accordingly, in contrast to the situation of individuals 
laboring for their family factories whose rights and responsibilities as a worker were often 
conflated with their rights and responsibilities as a family member, this formalization of 
production relations gave workers at Treasure Island (as well as in other like industrial 
settings) different, if not more, opportunities to bargain for self-interests separate from their 
social obligations toward their bosses and co-workers, many of whom were also their friends 
and neighbors. The relatively large size of Treasure Island also made it more favorable than 
family factories for young and/or unmarried women because it offered a work environment in 
which one could make friends. This is in great contrast to a family factory environment like 
the Wang family factory where one often worked alone, with one's own family, or with only a 
few other employees. 
 
The Wang family factory and Treasure Island thus epitomize two different types of 
workplace in Taiwan's industrial sector. Correspondingly, the experiences of Mei-ling and 
Ch'un-mei were exemplary of women under similar circumstances, who were placed in each 
of these settings due to their family economic situations. Together, these constituted the 




Globally and economically, women like Mei-ling and Ch'un-mei were an integral part of 
the labor force in Taiwan's post-World War II economic development that was closely 
related to the concurrent process of global industrialization. Past literature has established 
that global industrial expansion is a gendered process, in which women are often the targeted 
workers for the newly created industrial work (Nash & Fernandez-Kelly, 1983; Pun, 2005; 
Salzinger, 2003). However, the experience of women workers around the globe does not 
appear to be homogeneous. Ethnographic studies from different parts of the world indicate 
that global industrialization is also a process of flexible accumulation that employs 
increasingly heterogeneous workforces and utilizes multiple modes of production (Harvey, 
1990). Accordingly, different models of regulation based on gender ideologies have been 
developed to manage labor (Mills, 2003; Ong, 1997), ranging from direct despotic labor 
management in large firms (Fernandez-Kelly, 1983; Lee, 1998; Ong, 1987) to paternalistic 
control in small-scale, family-centered factories (Greenhalgh, 1994; Hsiung, 1996; Lee, 
2004). Yet, if ideological constructions of women as docile and nimble-fingered workers have 
facilitated their massive recruitment as an ideal workforce for the global assembly line, the 
experiences and resources of wage labor also provide these women with new means to 
contest their subordination both in the workplace and in other areas of daily life (Mills, 2003: 
48). Women workers seeking to improve their lives have been observed to adopt strategies 
both within and outside the traditional realm of class struggle, drawing inspiration from their 
individual cultures (Cairoli, 1998; Kim, 1997; Simon, 2003). Despite the fact that most of 
the tactics lacked the effectiveness to challenge capital's hegemony, these cultural struggles 
frequently challenged the authority of others particularly in one's family, often with the 
result of engendering a new sense of self and community for the workers (Mills, 1999, 2003; 
Ong, 1997).  
 
The stories of Wang Mei-ling and Yang Ch'un-mei exemplify culturally specific modes 
of labor management and possibilities of workers' subversion, thereby supporting the above 
theorizations. Both women adopted the strategy of marriage resistance in their pursuit of 
personal goals. Locally and culturally, marriage has until recently been nearly universal to 
both men and women in Chinese societies including Taiwan (Jones, 2005; Thornton & Lin, 
1994). Marriage as a social institution is particularly significant to women, for it serves as 
both a symbol of and gateway to their ultimate (though subordinate) position in the Chinese 
kinship system (Wolf, 1972). Unmarried females are viewed as temporary members of their 
natal families. It is only through marriage that women are accepted into their husband's 
family and permanently integrated into a lineal line. It is also through marriage that a woman 
earns a rightful place in her husband's ancestral hall in the afterlife (Ahern, 1971; Harrell, 
1986). Marriage also provides the opportunity for men and women to perpetuate the family 
line through childbearing, the failure of which has been considered in Chinese culture as a 
serious breach of filial piety even today (Simon, 2004). Economically, marriage also grants, 
especially to women, some financial support and social security as men continue to be seen 
and act as primary breadwinners in contemporary Taiwanese households. Refusal or delay of 
marriage, therefore, is a major decision– and oftentimes a strategy – for women who struggle 
to negotiate a life trajectory other than the culturally prescribed roles of wife, mother, and 
daughter-in-law. 
 
Over the past twenty years, however, non-marriage for women is becoming more 
common in Taiwan especially in big cities (Chen, 2005: 62–63; Jones, 2005: 94–96).
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Concomitant is the phenomenon of the continued upward shift in age at marriage, which 
indicates that a substantial number of Taiwanese women will remain single during a large part 
of their early life course (Jones, 2005: 94).
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 This is primarily due to the expansion in female 
education and the fast growing economy in the past few decades that opened up employment 
opportunities for Taiwanese women particularly in the areas of service professions but also in 
manufacturing (Tables 1 and 2).
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 Labor force participation rates for women have risen 
accordingly. While many of these new jobs are repetitive, dead-end, and frequently poorly 
paid compared to the same tasks performed by men, they nonetheless provide women with an 
opportunity to be financially independent as well as find (mainly female) friendship and 
companionship at the workplace. 
 
The decision to remain single made by Wang Mei-ling and Yang Ch'un-mei thus 
dovetails with the general trends both globally and in the contemporary Taiwanese society. 
Yet, what also becomes clear from their life stories discussed below is, over time, within the 
bound of culture, whether a particular practice based on gender ideologies adopted for the 
benefit of either capital or labor can be continuously effective depends on its articulation with 
the ever-changing global as well as local economic conditions. Their stories challenge any 
simple, ahistorical conclusion about the connection between a woman's socioeconomic 
background and education attainment and her ability to pursue a life path alternative to the 
culturally prescribed ones (in this case, through the means of marriage resistance). I thus 
stress an analysis that takes into account not only spatial differences but also changes 
mediated by temporal factors. Comparative studies of gender and global industrialization 
should focus not only on cultural distinctions based on locale and interaction with other 
stratifying factors (such as class, race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, age, or sexuality) within 
a socio-cultural system, but also on how gender can produce different meanings and effects 
under different historical-economic circumstances. 
 
Table 1 
Opportunity of education in Taiwan by sex (%). 
School year     Secondary education 
a 
    Higher education 
b 
Age 12–17       Age 18–21 
Total  Male  Female   Total Male  Female 
1976      73.6  77.6  69.3    15.7  19.3  11.9 
1981      82.5  82.6  82.5    18.7  20.8  16.6 
1986      92.2  90.9  93.6    25.2  26.7  23.6 
1991      95.4  93.6  97.3    37.9  38.1  37.7 
1996      95.8  94.1  97.6    47.7  45.7  49.8 
1999      99.6  98.3  101.0    61.0  57.8  64.4 
2000      99.2  98.1  100.5    68.4  65.7  71.3 
2001      98.6  98.3  100.6    77.1  74.5  79.9 
 
Source: Adapted from Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics (DBGAS) 
(2002). 
a
 The numerator equals the number of students attending junior and senior high schools  
(including night schools, special-aid schools, and schools of continuing 
education) and the first three years of the five-year junior colleges. The denominator equals 
the number of people aged 12 to 17 at the end of the year in question.  
b
 The numerator equals the number of students attending junior colleges (including colleges 
of distance education and the last two years of five-year junior 
colleges) and four-year colleges and universities. The denominator equals the number of 
people aged 18 to 21 at the end of the year in question. 
 
Gender and Taiwan's recent economic restructuring 
 
It was only in the 1960s that the Taiwan government adopted an export-oriented initiative 
to spearhead its industrialization. By the 1980s, however, Taiwan had grown into a 
manufacturing powerhouse in the global economy. Yet, ironically, it was also at the peak of 
its success that Taiwanese industrial producers began to feel the squeeze caused by changes 
in both Taiwanese society and internationally. Production cost was on the rise as a result. To 
solve these problems, Taiwanese industrial producers developed cost-effective strategies such 
as reorganizing the division of labor on the shop floor, reducing factory size, or upgrading the 
quality of production (Lee, 2004). They also explored new sources of cheap labor, adopting 
more radical practices such as relocating their production overseas (Hsing, 1998) and 
importing foreign workers to their shop floor in the country (Lee, 2002). By the late 1990s 
Taiwan had exported most of its labor-intensive industries that once made it globally famous. 
 
Gender is a key to the understanding of Taiwan's recent economic restructuring. As in 
many parts of the world, in the initial stage of Taiwan's export industrialization in the late 
1960s and 1970s, it was young, single women who were recruited by factory owners (Kung, 
1994). With the endorsement of their parents, young girls often started working as soon 
as they graduated from elementary school; their monthly wages were frequently the only 
regular, reliable source of income of their families. However, as Taiwan's economy started to 
take off and the economic conditions of individual families (particularly in rural areas) began 
to improve, parents no longer felt the pressure of having to send their daughters to work at an 
early age but could consider keeping them in school longer. By the late 1970s, the majority of 
Taiwanese girls were able to continue their education to junior high school or even 
(vocational) high school or junior (two-year) college education. Concomitantly, jobs in the 
rapidly expanding service sector quickly lured away many of these young women, who were 
better educated than previous generations and who considered service sector employment as 
more modern, prestigious, and providing better chances for upward mobility and marriage 
prospect than manufacturing work. The impact of a changing labor market was further felt 
due to the fact that the birth rate in Taiwan had declined significantly since the 1960s and, as 
a consequence, Taiwan began to experience a decrease in the population between age twenty 
and twenty-four by the mid- 1980s; there were fewer young people available for hiring than 
before.
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 Despite continuous technological upgrading and capital investment, most Taiwanese 
industrial producers still relied on cheap labor for profits. Accordingly, many of them saw the 
short supply of young women workers as a major obstacle to remain competitive in the world 
market. The strategies mentioned in the previous paragraph resonate with their interests in 
reducing labor costs and exploring new sources of cheap labor. These strategies, in turn, had a 
profound impact on the remaining female workforce. In recent years there has been an 
increase in employment opportunities for married women, who were previously perceived as 
less dependable because of their domestic responsibilities, but now are regarded as more 
reliable because young women are no longer available (DGBAS, 2001). In addition, young 
women who chose to continue to work in factories tended to have a sense of economic 
independence because industrial employers needed them. Some even felt that they could 
choose to remain unmarried and support themselves with their wages, resonating with the 
larger demographic trends indicated in the previous section (Lee, 2008). 
 
Table 2 
Educational attainment of civilian population age 15 and over in Taiwan (%). 
Average of year  Total   Primary and below  Junior high  Senior high and vocational  Junior college and above 
1976  100.0  60.5    14.8   17.7     7.0 
1981   100.0  52.1    16.2   21.6     9.8 
1986   100.0  44.5    17.4   26.3     11.7 
1991   100.0  37.4    17.8   29.9     14.8 
1996   100.0  30.7    17.3   32.8     19.2 
2001   100.0  25.5    16.3   33.7     24.5 
Source: Adapted from Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics (DBGAS) 
(2002). 
The numerator equals the number of students attending junior and senior high schools 
(including night schools, special-aid schools, and schools of continuing 
education) and the first three years of the five-year junior colleges. The denominator equals 
the number of people aged 12 to 17 at the end of the year in question. The numerator equals 
the number of students attending junior colleges (including colleges of distance education and 
the last two years of five-year junior colleges) and four-year colleges and universities. The 
denominator equals the number of people aged 18 to 21 at the end of the year in question. 
 
The stories of two Taiwanese women 
 
Wang Mei-ling and Yang Ch'un-mei were both born in 1965 and thus slightly younger 
than the first generation of female workers who experienced firsthand the transition of 
the Taiwanese economy from one based on agriculture to one centered on industrial 
manufacturing (c.f. Kung, 1994). Nonetheless, their work experiences are similar in many 
respects to that of the generation before them. They are older, however, than the generations 
coming of age during and after the recent economic restructuring. By the early 1990s 
when Taiwanese industrial employers were competing for younger, better-educated workers 
with their counterparts in the service sector, Mei-ling and Ch'un-mei were already in 
their late twenties. They were considered too old for entrylevel jobs in the service sector but 
too inexperienced or short of right credentials to assume a position of higher responsibilities. 
Many employers also hesitated hiring people like them, due to the concern that they might get 
married and leave the wage labor market for a domestic life forever. Paradoxically, these 
drawbacks also made them desirable factory workers. Their advantages and disadvantages in 
Taiwan's wage labor market under the recent economic restructuring were thus both derived 
from their between and-betwixt status. 
 
Wang Mei-ling: daughter of an industrial–entrepreneurial Family 
 
Wang Mei-ling's family grew asparagus for international markets in the early post-World 
War II years. In the late 1970s, following the example of many of his fellow villagers in 
Homei, Mei-ling's father used the capital accumulated from agricultural production to set up 
a weaving factory on his farmland, to take advantage of Taiwan's full-fledged export 
industrialization at the time. The Wang factory was essentially a family business. The four 
children in the family–Mei-ling's elder brother, her two elder sisters and Mei-ling herself- 
constituted the core of the workforce. The children were still going to junior high or high 
school when their father started the factory. They worked side by side with hired employees, 
tending looms after school as well as on weekends. They also had to fill in for workers who 
were sick or absent from work. Mei-ling's brother also served as a mechanic. 
 
Compared to women of her generation in Homei, Mei-ling was considered privileged. 
While many of the girls in her cohort had only junior high school qualifications, Mei-ling as 
well as her elder siblings all went to vocational high school. After high school, they were all 
encouraged by their parents to stay home and work at the family factory until, for the girls, 
they got married and moved out to join their husbands' families. Meiling and her second sister, 
the two youngest children in the Wang family, had a different idea about their future, however. 
They both wanted a career not only outside their father's textile factory but outside 
manufacturing altogether. In order to enhance their chance of finding a white-collar job in 
Taiwan's expanding service sector, they both expressed the wish to have more education; they 
wanted to have at least a junior college diploma. As the elder of the two, Mei-ling's second 
sister made her request to their parents first after her high school graduation. Although she 
had to wait a few years, she eventually got their (particularly financial) support to attend a 
local junior college. Mei-ling, one year younger than her second sister, made her demand 
about continuing schooling as soon as she graduated from high school. Her parents told her to 
wait because they could not afford to pay for two college tuitions at the same time. Generally, 
such a delay is not an issue because younger female children in a Taiwanese family often 
have the advantage over their elder female siblings in educational attainment, given that the 
family budget usually improves over the course of the domestic cycle (Parish & Willis, 1993). 
In this case, however, Mei-ling was also getting older while she was waiting. 
 
Mei-ling also told her family that she would not consider the possibility of marriage until 
she graduated from junior college, despite her parents' matchmaking efforts and the fact that 
she was approaching thirty, a fairly old age for Taiwanese women to be still unmarried. 
Mei-ling's insistence, at remaining single until she completed her college education was 
informed by her understanding of gender roles in Taiwanese society, especially the drastic 
change in social surroundings and the many more family responsibilities that a woman had to 
endure upon marriage (cf. Gallin, 1994; Lan, 2006: 94–124). Taiwan is traditionally a 
patrilineal, patrilocal society. Even though in recent years an increasing number of 
newly-wed couples have chosen to establish their own residence instead of living with the 
husband's parents, the duty of a daughter-in-law remains central to a married woman's life. 
This includes not only attending to domestic chores and caring for senior members (primarily 
parents-in-law but sometimes also grandparents-in-law) but, in the context of Taiwan's export 
industrialization, also frequently includes laboring in one's in-law's family enterprise (Hsiung 
1996). This was certainly the life of Mei-ling's eldest sister who, according to Mei-ling, was 
obliged to work at her father-in-law's textile factory alongside with her four other 
sisters-in-law, until her father-in-law's retirement. 
 
In any case, Mei-ling listened to her parents and waited; she made her request again only 
after her sister's graduation from junior college. This time, however, she was discouraged by 
her parents as they were worried that a few more years of schooling would only make her 
older and further diminish her prospects of marriage. They did not want her to be left alone, 
without anybody or any family to take care of her, when she got old. They also had to bear 
the social pressure for having a spinster grownup daughter. Mei-ling's parents also shared the 
idea of many of their fellow villagers who did not see much value in higher education for 
young women (the education for young men, on the other hand, was an entirely different 
matter). They saw their primary responsibility as parents as finding a good husband from a 
respectable family for their daughter, so that her future would be well-attended. Following 
this logic, they actually invested more on their daughters than many of their friends or 
neighbors by sending their daughters to high school (and even junior college). They did not 
feel that they had to oblige to their youngest daughter's wish this time. 
 
Given Mei-ling's age, the first priority of Mei-ling's parents was to find her a husband. If 
they could not get her married, however, they would rather have her work at the family 
factory than go back to school. They needed her labor. Past literature on the industrialization 
of Taiwan has pointed out the many advantages of using one's own family as the chief 
labor force, particularly the efficiency and flexibility (in addition to a cheaper labor cost), as 
enabling Taiwanese factory owners to remain competitive in a global market that required 
increasingly lower prices and shorter turn-around time (Gereffi & Pan, 1994). The salience of 
family labor was made even clearer under Taiwan's recent economic restructuring, in which 
industrial producers were struggling to keep an inexpensive and stable workforce. Mei-ling's 
parents faced an additional problem: once both of Mei-ling's elder sisters were married, and 
the Wang family would lose their labor forever to the families of their husbands. 
 
The year 1991 was a turning point for the Wang family. In that year Mei-ling's second 
eldest sister got married (the eldest sister married a few years earlier) thereby leaving Meiling 
the only unmarried daughter at home who could help the family ease the labor shortage. Also 
in that year, Mei-ling's father resolved that he had had enough of running the family factory; 
he made the decision to retire, and passed the factory as inheritance to his son, Mei-ling's 
elder brother. It was also the year that Mei-ling decided that she had endured enough 
dismissal from her family. She was bitter about the fact that she was made to wait for her 
second sister to graduate from junior college, but her desire to go to school was eventually 
rejected by her parents. She made up her mind to go back to school. She enrolled secretly in a 
night junior college, using the money she had saved from years of working for her father, to 
pay for the initial tuition, and only told her parents about it the night before the semester 
began. By that time it was too late for her parents to force her to quit. They could only accept 
it as a fact. 
 
Mei-ling's brother inherited the family factory at a time when the industrial sector in 
Taiwan was experiencing a labor shortage. As a strategy to solve the labor problem, as well as 
to increase the profit margin, he decided to downsize the factory. With the new arrangement, 
he would only need three workers, one per shift, to take care of the looms. With Mei-ling 
working one shift during the day, he only needed to find two more workers to take care of the 
night and graveyard shifts.
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 He would be the mechanic himself. His plan was supported by 
his parents. It seemed reasonable to them all that, as long as Mei-ling remained unmarried, 
she was one of the family and she should and would devote herself wholeheartedly to the 
family. Yet, what was conveniently forgotten but nonetheless remained pertinent in 
everybody's mind was the fact that, under the Taiwanese patrilineal system, Mei-ling as a 
daughter is not – and will never be – a true and permanent member of the Wang family 
(Cohen, 1976; Wolf, 1972). In accordance with their opinion that Mei-ling's destiny should be 
with a husband and his family, Mei-ling's parents also believed that the Wang family should 
comprise themselves, their son, his future wife, and all the sons they bore (their daughters 
would eventually be married off just like their aunts were a generation before). This 
conviction, as well as Mei-ling's ambiguous status at home, was made evident in an argument 
that her parents had over her. Concerned about his daughter's welfare, Mei-ling's father 
considered giving his daughter NT$2 million so that she could have something to fall back on 
in case she remained single for her entire life. This was also the amount of money he gave his 
son, along with the factory, upon his retirement. Because this money might seem like an 
inheritance given to Mei-ling (although in reality Mei-ling's brother would be the sole heir of 
the Wang family farmland and other non-movable properties), this idea was rejected 
vehemently by Mei-ling's mother, who saw this as an unfair treatment of her son. She said 
that there was no precedent of giving daughters a share of the family inheritance; they should 
be, instead, given a dowry on the day of their wedding. By giving Mei-ling something other 
than the form of a dowry was to take away what rightfully belonged to her brother. 
 
When Mei-ling's brother failed to find two more employees to work on the night and 
graveyard shifts, Mei-ling became her brother's sole worker; she regularly worked 
8
 hours a 
day before going to school at night. When she had to be in class, Mei-ling's brother had no 
other choice but to turn off the machines. However, he tried to keep Mei-ling on the shop 
floor as much as possible. It was a necessary strategy to keep the factory going. Yet, Mei-ling 
spoke bitterly about it. She said that she was always urged to work whenever she was off 
from school. Her brother's wedding in 1992 seemed only to heighten her resentment. 
Mei-ling's sister-in-law did not come from a textile family; she knew nothing about weaving 
and she did not appear to be eager to learn. Mei-ling's brother rarely asked his wife to work in 
the factory. ―Tending looms is a lot of hard work, and he loves her too much,‖ Mei-ling 
would comment sarcastically about this situation. It might not be personal affection, however, 
but a family division of labor based on cultural beliefs that were at work here. Just like 
Meiling as an unmarried daughter was to work hard to help increase the collective wealth of 
her natal family (which would one day be inherited by her brother), the chief responsibility of 
Mei-ling's sister-in-law as a daughter-in law was to produce male heirs for the family. 
 
It became painfully obvious that Mei-ling's brother depended on her for the operation – 
and thereby, success – of his factory. Mei-ling was particularly angry that her labor was taken 
for granted by her family. Her relationship with her parents and brother turned even more 
sour when she announced that she would like to have Sundays off in addition to her school 
time. Mei-ling said that her mother was particularly upset. She saw her daughter's request as a 
further betrayal to her son and the Wang family. At the end, it was Mei-ling's action of going 
out every Sunday that forced the family to accept her absence as a fact. However, her mother 
and brother never quite forgot what she did. Their relationship has remained distant since 
then. 
 
The dilemma of Mei-ling illustrates the double-edged effect of culture on gender and 
global industrialization. On the one hand, under the principle of Taiwanese patriliny, family 
loyalty was constantly called upon to secure Mei-ling's labor. On the other hand, it was also 
the principle of patriliny that propelled Mei-ling's parents to think her future should be with a 
husband and his family. The Wang family's claim over her labor could only be temporary, 
especially now that the factory was owned and run by her brother but no longer by her father. 
Mei-ling's status as a spinster daughter hence created a betwixt-and-between state that lent 
legitimacy to the assertion of her parents and brother while at same time allowing enough 
ambiguity for her to pursue her personal aspirations. Mei-ling's situation also challenged a 
static understanding of the impact of global industrialization, however. The sense of 
possibility Mei-ling had about her life was partly derived from the success of the Wang 
family factory in, and the wealth accumulated through, Taiwan's early export-oriented 
industrialization. She was privileged to have more education – and likely a better chance for 
career development – than many women of her cohort in Homei. Yet, ironically, it was 
precisely the Wang family's concern for continual success under Taiwan's recent economic 
restructuring that made Mei-ling's labor indispensable to her family. This, as a result, caught 
her in a conflict between her needs and the needs of her family. 
 
Yang Ch'un-mei: daughter of a factory-less family 
 
Born into a poor farming family, Ch'un-mei did not have many of the privileges while 
growing up enjoyed by Mei-ling. She is the eldest daughter, followed by four brothers and 
two sisters. Her father was the sole economic source of the family when Ch'un-mei was 
young. With many mouths to feed but not enough means to do so, Ch'un-mei's father was 
constantly in debt and under pressure to look for non-agricultural earnings. However, as 
Taiwan's export industrialization had only begun, and young boys and girls were the preferred 
workforce, he could only supplement agricultural revenue with temporary, low-paid 
employment. Exhausted from his economic burden, Ch'un-mei's father frequently took his 
frustration out on his wife and children by abusing them physically. 
 
Like many girls of her generation and the generation before, Ch'un-mei began to work 
for industrial wages right after she graduated from elementary school at age twelve. She 
could have gone on to junior high school because the tuition was made affordable after the 
Taiwan government extended the mandatory education from six to nine years in 1968. Even 
so, Ch'un-mei's father wanted her to start working as soon as she finished elementary school. 
Like Mei-ling's parents who doubted the usefulness of higher education for women, 
Ch'unmei's father did not see much value in three extra years of schooling for girls. He 
insisted, however, that his sons should have at least junior high school education, because 
they needed it to find decent jobs. Although he changed his mind and allowed Ch'un-mei to 
go to junior high school after Ch'unmei begged him, she gave up this opportunity later. She 
said that she wanted to lessen her father's burden as she could no longer bear to see her father 
beating her mother. Her monthly salary quickly became her family's main source of income. 
 
For more than ten years Ch'un-mei was the primary breadwinner of the family. The 
hardest years came after her father's death when she became the household head and the 
sole wage earner at age nineteen. Her mother was too weak from years of bad health to 
assume the responsibility; she relied on her eldest daughter to make decisions as well as for 
economic and emotional support. Ch'un-mei's brothers and sisters were still at elementary or 
junior high school then. They were too young to be helpful in any major way. Only after the 
oldest of Ch'un-mei's younger brothers graduated from junior high school, finished his 
mandatory military service, and went to work as a relatively well-paid mechanic in a 
motorcycle shop, was Ch'un-mei able to shed her responsibilities. The economic condition of 
Ch'un-mei's family also started to improve. A new house was built a few years later with the 
wages of Ch'un-mei and some of her younger brothers. 
 
Only after she was freed from her primary family responsibility, did Ch'un-mei begin to 
pursue her own goals. She went back to junior high school in 1990 at age twenty-five, 
and graduated in 1994 when she was twenty-nine. She continued on to take the vocational 
high school entrance exam that summer, and was admitted to a well-known night school in a 
city near Homei. While pursuing her high school education, Ch'un-mei continued to work as 
a loom tender in the local textile industry. In addition to the pay that was one of the highest 
among industrial employments for women, the fact that she was an experienced, mature, and 
―duty-free‖ worker – as opposed to her more playful and less responsible younger colleagues, 
as well as married workers who were often distracted by their family obligations – also 
granted her some leverage from employers. Ch'un-mei was the kind of employee Taiwanese 
industrial producers preferred on their shop floor, and they were willing to make adjustments 
to retain her. On a few occasions Ch'un-mei thought about leaving the factory for a service 
job as that would give her more time to study even though the pay would be lower than that 
in the textile industry. However, every time she expressed her wish to resign, she was 
persuaded to change her mind by the management of the factory. 
 
Like Mei-ling, Ch'un-mei also gave no consideration to marriage, at least before she 
finished her (high) schooling. To give herself more personal time, after graduating from 
junior high school, she took residence at the Sacred Heaven Fo-tang, an I-Kuan Tao temple 
built, inhabited and managed by a group of middle-aged women who had by and large 
decided to remain celibate in order to devote their lives to study the Tao (Lee, 2008). 
Ch'un-mei had converted to I-Kuan Tao — ―a syncretic, universally salvational, apocalyptic, 
and evangelical religion whose members practice vegetarianism and are led by charismatic 
masters” (Skoggard, 1996: 157), in her early days of working in the textile industry. Over the 
years, Ch'un-mei developed a special communion with the residents at Sacred Heaven, 
located not far from where her mother's home. Ch'unmei spent most of her evenings in the 
fo-tang, and returned home to visit her mother from time to time. When asked why she 
decided to live in the fo-tang, Ch'un-mei said: 
 
For many years I was the one who had to take care of my family. I had to make all the 
 decisions, and solve all the problems. I got so tired, and exhausted [from both of the 
physical and mental stress.] Besides, my brothers need tolearn to make decisions. I am 
 glad to have this opportunity to be by myself for a while! My mom understands this  
 need of mine, too. [Author: ―What about the pressure to get married?‖] My mom worries 
 about finding me a husband. But I told her there's no guarantee marriage will do me any 
 good. Look at her marriage! My parents quarreled constantly, and my mother got beaten 
 so often… She looks much happier and more at ease now that my father has passed away; 
 nobody will hit her anymore. I don't want to live a life like hers. 
 
Arguably, compared to Mei-ling, Ch'un-mei enjoyed more autonomy at home. Although 
she was subjected to the great burden of being the sole breadwinner at a tender age after her 
father's untimely death, she also became the de facto family head and assumed the authority 
accordingly. She was looked up to by her mother and younger brothers and sisters. The 
decisions she made, particularly those about herself, were well respected. This does not mean, 
however, that her mother did not raise concerns over her choice of not getting married — or, 
at least, delaying marriage. Like Mei-ling's parents, Ch'unmei's mother was worried about her 
daughter's future. Yet, in contrast to Mei-ling who was facing persistent objections from her 
family, Ch'un-mei effectively persuaded her mother into accepting her decision. This was in 
part due to her comparatively autonomous status at home, but, more importantly, it was also 
because she was able to find an alternative social space that could shelter her as well as 
provide her with social and emotional support even without a husband. It was the thought that 
Ch'un-mei would be taken care of during her old age (but not simply the influence she had 
over her mother) that helped put her mother at ease with her non-marriage decision. 
Furthermore, by co-residing with a group of single women at a place with religious overtones, 
Ch'un-mei was joining a string of Chinese women, in both the imperial period and at the 
present time, who adopted the strategy of marriage resistance through religious means in their 
attempt to establish a life outside the traditional realm of patrilineal family (Lee, 2008). 
Although the choice of celibacy (either made by a man or a woman) has never been fully 
favored, and is always received with reservation, in Chinese societies including contemporary 
Taiwan (Li, 2002; Simon, 2004), it is nonetheless acknowledged as an option to marriage. 
Therefore, by joining Sacred Heaven Fo-tang, Ch'un-mei not only helped to reduce her 
mother's anxiety over her future, but also provided her family with culturally acceptable 
grounds to respond to the queries and curiosity of friends, neighbors, or even strangers about 
her marital status. 
 
The teaching of I-Kuan Tao emphasizes apocalyptic eschatology and individual salvation 
(Bosco, 1994). According to Skoggard (1996: 157–158): 
 
those who receive the Dao [Tao] will survive the apocalypse and be freed from the 
 endless cycle of death and rebirth for a period of ten thousand years. Followers are 
 expected to diligently and sincerely study the Dao [Tao] in order to perfect themselves 
 and through their example lead the rest of mankind to salvation. One accumulates merit 
 most surely by contributing time and money to the religion's proselytizing mission and 
 bringing in new recruits. 
 
Women of Sacred Heaven were certainly good models of this religious dedication (Lee, 
2008). Slightly older than Ch'un-mei, these women had fairly similar work and personal 
experiences to hers. Many of them converted to I-Kuan Tao in their late adolescence or early 
adulthood while living in factory dormitories. The original construction funds of Sacred 
Heaven came from some of the most senior fo-tang residents at the time when Ch'un-mei 
joined them, along with a few others who once lived in the fo-tang but were no longer there. 
These women one day decided that they should do more for the religion than simply 
improving themselves. They put together their own savings, purchased the land of the current 
site, and built a four-story building. They lived on the top three floors, and set up a fo-tang on 
the first floor that was also open to the public. Beginning as an effort of a small group of 
women to better serve their religion, Sacred Heaven gradually became a local I-Kuan Tao 
center. Over time, there were also other women joining Sacred Heaven as long-term residents, 
with Ch'un-mei being one of the newest and youngest members. There was no formal 
procedure to screen or evaluate those who expressed wish to live in the fo-tang; neither was 
there a legal contract for potential residents to sign. Women of Sacred Heaven seemed to 
genuinely welcome anyone who would like to join them. 
 
Together, women at Sacred Heaven lived a simple life. Their world centered mainly on 
their religious beliefs, and many of them spent much of their spare time running the fo-tang 
and assisting local worshippers who came to them for help. Similar to Mei-ling, their decision 
to remain single was mainly based on their understanding of women's role in the Taiwanese 
family, which led them to believe that a total separation from married life – and hence the 
time and energy consuming role of married women – would give them the best chance to 
study the Tao and, as a result, enhance their possibility to be salvaged from the everlasting 
suffering of reincarnation. Yet, they did not vow to become nuns as devoted women in other 
organized religions might choose to do. There was neither such religious ritual nor need in 
I-Kuan Tao for them to do so. They participated in the day-to-day social and economic life 
just like any other ordinary Taiwanese. The majority of them also kept close ties with their 
families of orientation. 
 
Still, they were a special group of women. Despite the fact that there was no formal ritual 
to signify the transition of their status, many of the middle-aged women in the fo-tang were 
considered as ―married‖ daughters in the eyes of their families. It was the very thought that 
they had already been ―married‖ that put in peace the mind of their elderly parents – 
including Ch'un-mei's mother – who would otherwise worry about their daughters'’ future. 
The ―married‖ status of women at Sacred Heaven was most notable on the second day of 
Chinese New Year when, according to Chinese culture, married daughters would go back to 
nian chia, the houses of their mothers. Ch'un-mei informed me that, on the morning of each 
lunar January Second, many of these women's paternal nephews would come to escort them 
home. She said: ―It's the custom. Brothers should send their sons to greet their aunts. That's 
the propriety one should observe towards one's married-off sisters.‖ 
 
Past literature indicates that the experience and resources of wage labor provide factory 
women with new means to confront their subordination in the workplace and other areas 
of daily life. Ch'un-mei's story exemplifies this point. Yet, to fully understand Ch'un-mei's life, 
we should take into account two more factors. Culturally, marriage continued to be an 
important concern if not for Ch'un-mei then for her mother. The reason that Ch'un-mei was 
able to remain single while pursuing her own goals was because she found an alternative 
social space acceptable to her mother.
7
 Ch'un-mei's optimism, however, was also related to 
the structural change in Taiwan's economy. Since Taiwanese industrial producers could no 
longer find enough young, single women but had to rely on married women (with children) as 
their main source of labor, many of the employers in Homei regarded unmarried, middle-aged 
women like Ch'un-mei as a better alternative. Ch'un-mei thus derived her sense of security 
from a favorable industrial wage labor market. Her advantage might be short lived, 
depending on the continual change in Taiwan's economy. At least for the time being, she was 
able to find a job and support herself with her income, even though she did not have the 




This article brings together two literatures that are usually discussed separately: labor and 
gender under global industrialization, and gender and family (epitomized by marriage) 
in the Chinese cultural context. Past studies have established that global industrial expansion 
is a gendered process, in which women are often the targeted workers for the newly created 
industrial workforce. However, the experience of women around the globe does not appear to 
be monolithic. Ethnographic studies from different parts of the world indicated that recent 
global industrialization is also a process of flexible accumulation that employs increasingly 
heterogeneous workforce and utilize multiple modes of production. Yet, if ideological 
constructions of women as docile and nimble-fingered workers facilitated their massive 
recruitment as an ideal workforce for the global assembly line, the experiences and resources 
of wage labor also provide these women with new means to contest their subordination both 
in the workplace and in other areas of daily life. Women workers seeking to improve their 
lives have been observed to adopt strategies both within and outside the traditional realm of 
class struggle, drawing inspiration from their individual cultures. 
 
The stories of Wang Mei-ling and Yang Ch'un-mei attest to culturally informed 
possibilities of workers' subversion. Both of them adopted the strategy of marriage resistance 
in their pursuit of personal goals, a decision shaped by their understanding of the gender roles 
and ideologies in the Taiwanese patrilineal kinship system. Their stories thus supported the 
above theorization. However, the different results of their similar practices are of great 
theoretical significance. They helped to problematize the tendency in the gender and global 
industrialization literature to treat culture as a constant. They highlighted the fact that the 
―heterogeneous workforce‖ utilized in the current global process of flexible accumulation is 
not identified simply by one's national or cultural origin, but also by the way one or one's 
family is incorporated into the process. This, in turn, provides a critique of the tendency in 
the literature on gender and the Chinese/Taiwanese family to essentialize culture. Thus, the 
stories of Mei-ling and Ch'unmei illustrate both the spatial differences and the changes 
mediated by temporal factors within the global industrial process. Consequently, whether a 
particular practice based on gender ideologies adopted by a worker in a(ny) given society to 
subvert the capital's control can be continuously effective, depends on its articulation with the 
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1 For the methodology of analyzing events through the life of one individual, see Behar 
(2003) and Shostak (2000).  
2 In Western countries, declining rates of marriage have been largely but not completely 
compensated by de facto arrangements such as common-law marriages or cohabitation. This 
does not appear to be the case in Taiwan (particularly outside metropolitan areas) or 
elsewhere in East and Southeast Asia where non-marriage among women has become 
common. There is little hard evidence on this, however (Jones, 2005). 
3 The average age of marriage for women was 22.8 in 1975, rising to 29 in 2006, while for 
men it rose from 27.1 to 32.6 during the same period (Government Information Office, 2008). 
4 In the early 2000s, the Ministry of Education quickly expanded the number of higher 
education institutions, thereby greatly increasing the number of students, both men and 
women, currently attending colleges and universities; as such, it is not comparable to the 
numbers from previous decades. For this reason, I did not include the statistics after 2001 in 
Tables 1 and 2.  
5 The population growth rate in 1957 was 3.5 %, from which it gradually declined to 1.8% in 
1982 and 0.47% in 2006. In relation, the total fertility rate (TFR, the average number of 
children born to a woman during her childbearing years) was 5 during the 1960s. It fell to 2 
in the 1980s, and further dropped to 1.12 in 2006 which was lower than many advanced 
capitalist countries including Japan (1.3), France (1.9), and the United States (2) 
(Government Information Office, 2008).  
6 To maximize productivity, textile factories in Homei and elsewhere in Taiwan operate 
twenty-four hours a day, and nearly three-hundred and sixty-five days a year. Accordingly, 
there are usually three shifts of loom tenders in the textile industry (for eight hours per shift), 
working around the clock. 
7 One could continue to raise the questions of why I-Kuan Tao was an option available to 
Ch’un-mei but not Mei-ling and, by extension, if Mei-ling had had the option, how her 
parents would have reacted to her decision. Yet, these are two different kinds of questions. 
The first one is about why a particular individual chooses to follow – or not to follow – a 
particular religion, which is always a difficult question to answer (cf. Sangren, 1987) and 
which may not be particularly useful to the issue of gender and global industrialization at 
hand. The second question, on the other hand, carries more theoretical significance for it asks 
about to what extent we can generalize the findings from the two cases presented in this 
article. It is also a difficult question to answer, however, because of the ethnographic fact that 
Mei-ling was not an I-Kuan Tao convert; nor was she seeking to legitimize her non-marital 
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